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Abstract
A growing number of expert organizations aim to provide knowledge for global environ-
mental policy-making. Recently, there have also been explicit calls for stakeholder en-
gagement at the global level to make scientific knowledge relevant and usable on the
ground. The newly established Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Services (IPBES) is one of the first international expert organizations to have system-
atically developed a strategy for stakeholder engagement in its own right. In this article,
we analyze the emergence of this strategy. Employing the concept “politics of legitima-
tion,” we examine how and for what reasons stakeholder engagement was introduced,
justified, and finally endorsed, as well as its effects. The article explores the process of
institutionalizing stakeholder engagement, as well as reconstructing the contestation of
the operative norms (membership, tasks, and accountability) regulating the rules for this
engagement. We conclude by discussing the broader importance of the findings for
IPBES, as well as for international expert organizations in general.
Experts have come to play a significant role in global environmental gover-
nance. The growing demand for policy-relevant knowledge has led to the emer-
gence of a new class of expert organizations to fulfill this role (Gupta et al. 2012;
Jasanoff and Martello 2004; Mitchell et al. 2006). This trend has been accom-
panied by another demand, namely one for stakeholder involvement. A number
of international science-policy initiatives call for stakeholder engagement, often
framed in terms of knowledge coproduction, to make scientific knowledge more
relevant and usable (Klenk and Meehan 2015).1
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1. A current example of this is the global research platform Future Earth, which promotes the
coproduction of knowledge by including stakeholders at different stages of the research process
(van der Hel 2016).
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The newly established Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) is one of the first international expert organizations
to have systematically developed a strategy for stakeholder engagement in its
own right. This article explores how IPBES addressed this challenge and finally
adopted a formal stakeholder engagement strategy (SES). In doing so, we ad-
dress a crucial research gap: although there is a growing literature on the open-
ing up of international organizations (Nasiritousi et al. 2016; Tallberg et al. 2013;
Zürn 2014) and on the construction of local, situated legitimacy (Connelly
2010; Turnhout et al. 2015), little empirical research has been conducted on
such participation in international expert organizations (Lidskog and Sundqvist
2011). One reason for this gap is that stakeholder engagement is almost always
conducted as a local, small-scale, and place-based practice, with only few sys-
tematic, ambitious efforts to engage stakeholders in global environmental as-
sessments (Saurugger 2010). For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) already includes stakeholders, but it has not yet devel-
oped a formal strategy (Beck et al. 2014; Gupta et al. 2012). Institutional aspects
of stakeholder engagement at the global level “have yet to be investigated
sufficiently” (van der Hel 2016, 167).
In this article, we explore how an international expert organization incor-
porates stakeholder engagement into its operative norms. We apply the concept
of the “politics of legitimation” by reconstructing how, why, and with what
effects rules and principles guiding stakeholder engagement have been justified
and finally adopted (Reus-Smit 2007). We focus in particular on contestation of
the operative norms that regulate stakeholder engagement, because they
determine membership, the assignment of tasks, and accountability (Reus-Smit
2007).
The emergence of the SES offers an excellent case for studying the politics
of legitimation. The idea (simply) of bringing stakeholders to the table was chal-
lenged at a very early stage. This moment of uncertainty triggered the politics of
legitimation. While there was relatively broad support for the participation of
stakeholders in general, implementing it became a matter of justifying who
should participate, for what purpose, and with what corresponding rights.
Whereas expert organizations such as the IPCC claim to be neutral and are re-
luctant to openly deal with the politics underlying their activities,2 IPBES “got its
hands dirty,” and put “messy” political questions such as participation and rep-
resentation on the agenda of its intergovernmental negotiations (Klenk and
Meehan 2015). Furthermore, the IPBES also faced the challenge of coping with
a plurality of stakeholders, all of them defending their own particular claims for
engagement; the spectrum ranged from representatives of United Nations organi-
zations, multilateral environmental agreements, and the scientific community, to
stakeholders from indigenous organizations and private organizations. Given the
2. See http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml, accessed March 15, 2016.
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broad and diverse spectrum of actors engaged, we reconstruct how IPBES was
finally able to adopt a strategy that was accepted by all the actors involved.
Our empirical materials consist, first, of participant observations of small-
scale workshops on stakeholder engagement, where for three years we followed
the negotiation process, mostly involving representatives of science, conserva-
tion, and indigenous NGOs; next, we collected participant observations of the
2013 and 2015 IPBES plenary meetings in Bonn; and finally, we conducted a
study of official documents from the IPBES (retrievable from the IPBES website)
and reports from multiple stakeholders and intergovernmental meetings
(retrievable from the IPBES website and IISD Reporting Services).
This article is divided into five sections. The next section provides an
introduction to the concept of the politics of legitimation in international rela-
tions, which serves as our framework for analysis; we discuss how it can be ap-
plied to and operationalized for an expert organization. The third section
describes the genesis of IPBES and explains the rationale behind its develop-
ment of an engagement strategy. The fourth section then analyzes the process
of negotiating the design of the SES. Focusing on the politics of legitimation,
it examines how operative norms about the membership, tasks, and account-
ability of stakeholders are justified, included in intergovernmental negotiations,
and finally adopted by the plenary. The concluding section discusses what
lessons can be learned from the IPBES regarding stakeholder engagement in inter-
national expert organizations in general, and regarding the politics of legitimation.
International Expert Organizations and the Politics of Legitimation:
A Framework for Analysis
In this article, the concept of the politics of legitimation is used to analyze the
negotiation of an institutional design for stakeholder engagement. In line with
recent constructivist work, the concept refers to the different ways in which
actors demand, challenge, and justify legitimacy (Reus-Smit 2007).
As Reus-Smit (2007) observed, political actors constantly seek to justify
their identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs, and in doing so they
engage in the politics of legitimation. This concept is in line with constructivist
scholarship that claims that a merely procedural view of legitimacy (Bäckstrand
et al. 2010) provides an insufficient basis for understanding citizen participation
and evaluating the legitimacy of participatory action (Leino and Peltomaa
2012). Legitimacy cannot simply be derived from theoretical concepts or nor-
mative principles. As an alternative, constructivist scholarship addresses the im-
portant yet little understood issue of how the legitimacy of organizations comes
into being and is maintained in a specific, situated context that also shapes an
organization’s interpretations (Connelly 2010; Leino and Peltomaa 2012;
Turnhout et al. 2015). In this view, legitimacy is consequently fragile and open
to challenge; it plays a reciprocal and highly political role. Also, these approaches
shift the emphasis from “who” to “how” questions, by drawing attention to the
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practices through which claims of legitimacy acquire status and authority (Hajer
2009; Jasanoff and Martello 2004). Following Reus-Smit, the contestation
almost always focuses on what should constitute the operative norms, and
how they should be interpreted. When it comes to stakeholder engagement,
these are specifically the operative norms that regulate membership, the assign-
ment of tasks, and accountability, as well as the corresponding practices of
justification.
In addition, we advance the scholarship by operationalizing the reflexive
and a performative dimension of this concept. First, as Reus-Smit (2007, 159)
held, politics is essential to the cultivation and maintenance of the legitimacy
of an institution. He directed attention to moments where the legitimacy of an
institution could no longer be taken for granted, but was challenged and had to
be justified (Connelly et al. 2006). This reflexive element characterizes the emer-
gence of an expert organization at the international level that faces a normative
and institutional void, a lack of shared norms and rules according to which
(legitimate) decisions should be made (Hajer 2009, 34). For example, in the
case of IPBES, the operative norms regulating engagement were not given, but
needed to be chosen and justified.
Second, the politics-of-legitimation lens focuses our attention on strategies
to justify and institutionalize particular operative norms that have a performative
dimension; they are by no means neutral, but have substantial practical impli-
cations. Following Foucault, constructivist scholarship has helped to show how
forms of knowledge-making are not only critical, but also mutually constitutive
of world-making (Jasanoff 2012). From such a perspective, the politics of legit-
imation are not a simple, neutral input into policy, but a set of performative and
reiterative practices that change the phenomena they seek to represent. Opera-
tive norms, for instance, specify who gets to participate in defining what forms
of knowledge matter. They codify the rights and roles of actors within an orga-
nization, and determine how norms are put into practice, and thus constrain or
enable agency. The definition of categories such as who speaks for science and
who for stakeholders largely influences how stakeholders are “invited” and how
rules of procedure are set up to guide the work of the organization (Chilvers and
Kearnes 2016; Wynne 2007). For example, narrowly framing an environmental
topic as a purely technical issue reduces the role of stakeholders to one of trust-
ing or distrusting the experts, leaving little room for engagement (Lidskog and
Sundqvist 2015).
To operationalize these insights for the empirical analysis, we examined
how and to what end the involved actors justified and adopted norms, and what
the effects of the choices were. The three operative norms studied here are as
follows: the membership of stakeholders as constituencies as well as addressees;
the task(s)delegated to stakeholders, which implicitly delineate lines of responsibil-
ity between stakeholders, scientists and governments; and the accountability and
governance of stakeholders—how and by whom the work of stakeholders is moni-
tored and regulated.We reconstructed the politics of legitimation—operationalized
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as the negotiations about these three operative norms—by identifying how,
when, and why the spectrum of choices of ways to include stakeholders was
opened up, and when it was closed down (Stirling 2008).
The Making of the IPBES and Its Rationale for Engagement
Throughout the 1990s, leading scientists as well as policy actors pushed for in-
dependent global scientific assessment in the field of biodiversity (Mauz and
Granjou 2010). These efforts resulted in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MA), which published its results in 2005 (Reid et al. 2006). Established in
2012 under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP), the IPBES builds on the achievements of the MA and IPCC. After
the MA, a series of intensive multistakeholder negotiations were held under
the auspices of the UNEP, in which the representatives of governments, inter-
governmental agencies, and science and conservationist NGOs were included.
A major milestones occurred in 2010, at a meeting in Busan, Korea, where
the main features of the future organization were adopted. Interestingly, in this
multistakeholder setting it was decided that the new panel should—like the
IPCC—be an intergovernmental organization. As result, it was governments
that, in Panama in 2012, founded the IPBES as an independent intergovern-
mental organization open to all member countries of the United Nations. So
far, the organization’s plenary sessions have been held in Bonn, Germany (January
2013); in Antalya, Turkey (December 2013); and again in Bonn (January 2015). A
small secretariat in Bonn assists the plenary and its two subsidiary bodies: the
Bureau, which is in charge of the administrative functions, and the Multidisciplin-
ary Expert Panel (MEP), which provides advice on scientific and technical matters.3
In the IPBES negotiations, we have reconstructed three interlinked ratio-
nales for why the actors called for and justified stakeholder engagement. First,
during the scoping process it was recognized that the IPBES would need diverse
forms of knowledge; producing yet another global assessment report on the
state of biodiversity and ecosystem services science would not meet the needs
of its audiences and would fail to support local action on the ground. Instead, in
contrast to the IPCC’s globalism, and informed by the experiences of the MA
(Larigauderie 2015, 73), IPBES decided to pursue a global but multiscale assess-
ment, and to complement this process by setting up three additional working
areas: namely, knowledge generation, capacity building, and policy support. To
perform these additional tasks, input from local stakeholders was required and
representatives of “local” and “indigenous” knowledge were invited to the pro-
cess (Borie and Hulme 2015). Stakeholders have access to knowledge about
both the specific regional and local conditions and impacts of biodiversity loss,
3. It is staffed by twenty-five experts from different disciplines with a high level of expertise in
biodiversity or alternative sources of knowledge, such as indigenous knowledge.
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and are key to the implementation of management strategies. Thus, IPBES
sought, at least in words, to take seriously the claim that global environmental
knowledge-making requires diverse voices and openness to diverse forms of
knowledge.
Second, as leading involved scientists claimed, stakeholder participation
was seen as a means to enhance the sense of ownership within and commitment
to the IPBES process (see Watson 2005). These depended in part on “whether it
has been produced through a participatory and inclusive process” (Gupta et al.
2012, 70). It was therefore seen as a way of ensuring buy-in regarding the final
knowledge product (Nasiritousi et al. 2016). The rationale is that engaging
stakeholders reduces skepticism toward research results, thus enhancing the
likelihood of scientific knowledge having an impact (van der Hel 2016, 169).
Third, inviting those most affected to participate in knowledge-making
and implementation can lead to better governance, since the active involvement
of stakeholders is required if science is to provide useful products (see van der
Hel 2016). If an expert organization on biodiversity includes those directly
affected by ecosystem degradation and loss of biodiversity, most notably local
and indigenous peoples, then the chances are high that tailored solutions will
be developed.4 The rationale for incorporating stakeholders into the processes
of knowledge production was thus to enhance the effectiveness of the gover-
nance regime. In sum, the rationales for engagement were mainly instrumental,
and had a strategic orientation toward promoting effective participation as a way
to enhance the knowledge base and increase its relevance for decision-making,
as well as to enforce global governance.
Stakeholder Engagement: Tracing the Trajectory
Engaging stakeholders has remained a constant quest for IPBES (Opgenoorth
et al. 2014), in both content and form. The negotiations turned out to involve
dynamic processes in which the content of the agenda, the style of negotiation,
and its context were substantially transformed. Throughout this process, various
actor groups developed, justified, and constantly rewrote the engagement strat-
egies. To account for this dynamic, we distinguish three phases: experimentation
and opening up, translation into operative norms and conflict, and institutionalization
and closing down. In each phase, new categories and operative norms emerged,
and these norms were contested within and between the groups who commen-
ted (states and stakeholders) and those engaged in translating the often diverg-
ing comments into a new draft of the SES (the IPBES bodies). In what follows,
we examine each phase by elaborating on the three operative norms of member-
ship, tasks, and accountability and governance of engagement.
4. http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/bridging/bridging.17.pdf p 328/9, accessed
March 15, 2016.
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Phase 1: Experimentation and Partial Opening Up
The IPBES plenary invited the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) and the International Council for Science (ICSU)—both of
which have been outspoken advocates of IPBES for many years—to
work with relevant stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and local
communities, and the private sector, and with the secretariat, to prepare,
in consultation with the Bureau and the Multidisciplinary Expert Panel, a
draft stakeholder engagement strategy for supporting the implementation
of the work programme. (IPBES 2013a, 1)
Following this request, IUCN and ICSU issued a call for a broad set of
stakeholders (with 314 submissions received in response to 1,500 invitations)
in spring 2013. A meeting then took place in Paris (2013) to produce a prelim-
inary draft of the SES. This draft was reviewed by all invited participants, includ-
ing those who did not attend (180 comments in total). The IPBES Bureau and
the MEP revised the document at a meeting in June 2013.5 The IPBES secretariat
made this draft available online for an open review between June 17 and July 28,
2013. During that time, stakeholders met at the regional and subregional levels
to discuss and comment on the document. In total, stakeholders as well as state
representatives produced 81 comments that were then displayed on the IPBES
website. In cooperation with the Bureau and the MEP, the IPBES secretariat
incorporated the comments into the document in August before putting it on-
line as one of the working documents for the IPBES plenary session in Antalya,
Turkey, in December 2013 (IPBES-2).6 While stakeholders and state representa-
tives articulated the importance of this draft produced during the first phase, a
concluding discussion on the SES was postponed, apparently “due to a lack of
time” (IISD 2013).
Task: IPBES invited stakeholders to take part in “supporting the implemen-
tation of the work programme” (IPBES 2013a, 1, emphasis added). Instead of
having stakeholders contribute to, or even take over, a broad range of tasks
(such as scoping the agenda and policy support), their task, and thus their scope
of engagement, was restricted to assisting with the implementation. However, a
number of stakeholders challenged this narrow definition of their task. As an
alternative, they demanded that the scope of stakeholder engagement be
enlarged to encompass “developing the work programme and [participating]
in other decision-making processes” (IPBES 2013b). The WWF, for instance,
called for a broader set of tasks (including more rights), enabling them to make
contributions “to decisions made by the plenary, Bureau and MEP.” However,
this statement was not included in the draft document prepared for the 2013
plenary session in Antalya.
5. The result was a document called “IPBES Intersessional Process, Online Review, Draft Stake-
holder Engagement Strategy for Supporting Implementation of the IPBES Work Programme.”
6. This document appeared as IPBES (2013b).
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Accountability and governance: During this phase, stakeholders were invited
to develop an SES, while operative norms defining their accountability and gov-
ernance were excluded from the negotiations. In accordance with the intergov-
ernmental status of the platform, states decided on the final wording of the
strategy and developed it in close coordination with other IPBES bodies. The
secretariat and the MEP deleted statements in the draft that did not support
the frame for the SES set by the plenary. This frame included a facilitator role
for the two major science and conservationist NGOs, ICSU and IUCN. Their role
was welcomed in general. However, some indigenous organizations stressed in
small stakeholder meetings, as well as in the plenary, that ICSU and IUCN can-
not speak for all stakeholders. Indigenous representatives underlined the need
to “recognize the diversity of [stakeholder] groups collaborating with the Plat-
form.”7 Along these lines, the issue of the representation and underrepresenta-
tion of stakeholder groups was raised frequently in the comments on earlier
drafts of the strategy; this theme included the question of whether private firms
should be involved.8
Among the states that commented on the draft, China argued that “full-
scale stakeholder engaging actions will add considerable burden to IPBES,
distract limited resources from the priority” (China 2013). In contrast, the
Philippines requested the “establishment of institutional mechanism within
IPBES to enable and facilitate stakeholder engagement in all activities” and to
“be inclusive: enable access and effective participation of different stakeholders
in IPBES processes and ensure that the diverse views of stakeholders are
adequately presented and given due consideration” (Philippines 2013). While
other states welcomed the engagement of stakeholders in general, they also
stressed the need to deal with potential conflicts—such as asymmetries in capac-
ity and financial resources. The problem of fair and balanced representation was
explicitly addressed in the draft. As a result, the need to ensure “balanced rep-
resentativeness in participation among the different stakeholders” (IPBES
2013b, 3) was taken up as a guiding principle.
Membership: The inclusion of the issue of legitimate representation on the
agenda also opened up a discussion on who would actually count as a stake-
holder. The Phase 1 draft states:
In the context of the implementation of the work programme, stakeholders
are institutions, organizations or groups that:
(a) contribute to the activities of the work programme through their
experience, expertise, knowledge, data and information; and/or
(b) use the outcome of the work programme; and/or
(c) encourage, facilitate and support the participation of relevant
individuals in IPBES activities; and/or
(d) are affected, positively or negatively, by the implementation of the
work programme. (IPBES 2013a, 2)
7. See, for instance, www.iisd.ca/vol31/enb3110e.html, accessed March 15, 2016.
8. For an overview of all comments, see Heubach (2013).
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As a result, the category of stakeholders is framed in an encompassing and
inclusive way (by including the tasks of contributing, using, and encouraging
(a–c). In fact, participants wondered how to identify potential “unknown stake-
holders” that have not yet heard of IPBES. Along these lines, the Annex to the
draft document provides a chaotic assemblage of criteria for the inclusion of
stakeholders. It states that they should have the “relevant rights, knowledge,
skills, experiences and qualifications” or the “capacity to take action” (IPBES
2013b, 6). An alphabetical list of potential stakeholders is then presented; this
contains overlapping categories beginning with “academic education communi-
ties” and ending with “young people and children,” with twenty others in be-
tween (IPBES 2013b, 6). Thus, we can observe a phase of opening up for
negotiations on membership and its operative norm.
A number of critical issues also emerged during this phase. For instance,
participants criticized the definition of a stakeholder and its lack of specificity.
At the plenary sessions in Antalya (IPBES-2), the conflict over the categorical
attributions of stakeholder status was explicitly expressed; ICSU and IUCN
argued that “stakeholders should be seen as a relationship of partners and
not just unspecified generic ‘stakeholders’”(ICSU and IUCN 2013). Similarly,
at a stakeholders’ day prior to the meeting in Antalya, an indigenous peoples’
representative articulated the concern that indigenous peoples “do not feel
encompassed by theword ‘stakeholders’” (IPBES Stakeholders 2013). Later, during
the plenary, she said that “IPBES … must recognize … indigenous peoples and
local communities, as knowledge-holders, rights-holders, and partners, and recog-
nize our distinct contribution to the platform” (Carino 2013).
The notions of rights-holders and partners refer to the principle of being
affected (d) by the strategy, quoted above. This principle is often cited in nor-
mative debates on the legitimacy of global governance. It states that “those who
are affected by a decision (the impactees) should be entitled to have a say” in
decisions (Marchetti 2012, 32). This far-reaching definition of stakeholders ap-
peared in earlier drafts of the SES but was deleted when the secretariat, together
with the Bureau and the MEP, prepared the document for the plenary meeting
in Antalya. In this document, any mention of being affected that might result in
a rights-based terminology had vanished.
This first phase can be characterized by a mode of experimentation (see
Chilvers and Kearnes 2016), in which some operative norms were made open
to influence by stakeholders while others were made closed to inputs through
conventional framings of the task and accountability.
Phase 2: Translation into Operative Norms and Conflict
The IPBES plenary session in Antalya ended without a working session on the
draft of the engagement strategy being held, and an interlude—the second
phase—followed. The plenary requested that the IPBES secretariat provide a
revised version of the SES draft without giving any specifications. Published
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online for comments by the secretariat in summer 2014, the revised version of
the SES included an implementation plan and stated:
In drawing up this revised strategy, the secretariat also consulted the Stake-
holder Engagement Standard (AA1000SES) developed by the Institute of
Social and Ethical Accountability, which provides a framework to help orga-
nisations ensure that stakeholder engagement processes are purpose driven,
robust and deliver results. (IPBES 2014b, 2)
Task: What is most striking about this new draft is its attempt to formalize
operative norms for stakeholder engagement. In this context, the aim of formal-
ization was to make sure that the SES procedures are “purpose driven, robust,
and deliver results” (IPBES 2014b, 2). However, this type of formalization
certainly contributed to restricting the available space for bottom-up and inclusive
process (see Sundqvist et al. 2015).
Governance and accountability: This intervention by the secretariat shows
that negotiating the content of stakeholder engagement can also lead to conflicts
about who is actually in charge of the process—that is, about the accountability
and governance of the strategy. Given the discussion above, one might expect
the secretariat’s formalized new draft simply to become the basis for negotia-
tions in the plenary. However, in fall 2014, IUCN, ICSU, and the Germany-
based Network NEFO held a Pan-European workshop and produced a response.
It states, “we believe that the document IPBES/2CRP.6 [the older draft from
Antalya] should be the basis for the development of a revised strategy” (IUCN,
ICSU, and NEFO 2014). The document then further comments on the Antalya
draft, basically ignoring the draft produced by the secretariat. It justifies this action
with reference to the “wide stakeholder consultative process” and the review by
members of the Bureau and the MEP that resulted in the Antalya draft (IUCN,
ICSU, and NEFO 2014). This combined statement had an effect. The final draft
for the negotiations presented at the 2015 plenary session in Bonn mainly built
on the Antalya draft. Thus, the secretariat’s attempt to impose formalization from
above failed to make the draft more robust. As a consequence, it faced resistance
from stakeholder groups and mobilized bottom-up processes.
Membership: This version (summer 2014) of the SES, published online by
the secretariat, reframed the very notion of the stakeholder. Instead of defining
stakeholders in line with the practice of contributing, encouraging, and using, as
we quoted above, this version spoke of “three broad groups that need to be in-
volved: policymakers … including the government officials of the 119 Member
states of the IPBES, scientists and knowledge holders, … [and] practitioners (or
implementers)” (IPBES 2014b). This recategorization is indicative of the con-
stant struggle to come to terms with the contested concept of the stakeholder.
This version would have undone the clear distinction between governments, on
the one hand, and stakeholders, on the other, disturbing the allocation of power
within the organization. That is why the notion of membership was once again
up for negotiation in Bonn in 2015.
68 • Stakeholder Engagement in the Making: IPBES Legitimization Politics
Phase 3: Institutionalization and Closing Down
Task: The final phase of the strategy spans the negotiations at the IPBES plenary
session in Bonn, 2015. For the first time, state representatives negotiated the SES
draft in the plenary, as well as in a contact group, to remove the remaining
brackets indicating disagreement from the document. The contact group, which
was open to observers during its three-day meeting, essentially dealt with two
major areas of concern: membership issues (eligibility criteria), and account-
ability and governance issues (oversight mechanisms).
Membership: The first concern emerged when the wording “balanced repre-
sentation” of stakeholders was deleted from the document, because some states
wanted to avoid funding requests that might result from use of the term. When
it was excluded, a number of developing countries objected that stakeholder
participation was and might continue to be dominated by Western countries.
They insisted that the IPBES must ensure balanced participation. The negotia-
tions paused; microphones were switched off and informal chatting in small
groups of three or four dominated the scene. Delegates, especially from the
USA and a number of developing countries, headed by China and Egypt, dis-
cussed alternative wordings that would satisfy the requests. As a result, ques-
tions about stakeholder membership became contested issues. With some
delegates already suggesting that work on the document be postponed for an-
other year, a solution was announced: IPBES “encourages all stakeholders repre-
senting, inter alia, their regional, disciplinary and knowledge systems in their
diversity to collaborate with the Platform” (IISD 2015). “In their diversity”
was the wording that finally resolved the crisis, expressing concerns about bal-
anced representation without granting any specific rights. Furthermore, stake-
holders were defined as “(a) Contributors: scientists, knowledge holders and
practitioners and (b) End users: policymakers,”merging the categorization of practice
with that of actors (IPBES 2014a, 3).
Accountability and governance: To understand the dynamics of this debate, it
is worthwhile to stress that informal meetings took place not only between state
delegates,9 but also between delegates and stakeholders. To give an example of
this dynamic, each morning stakeholders would meet up to discuss the agenda
of the day and how they would lobby delegates on stakeholder-related issues.
One day near the end of the negotiations, part of the Chinese delegation,
including its head, showed up at the morning gathering of the stakeholders.
The participants at the stakeholder meeting briefly introduced themselves,
stressing their diversity and the networks to which they were connected.
Through an interpreter, a few cordial words were exchanged, after which the
head of the Chinese delegation encouraged the stakeholders to continue their
meeting while he remained in the room. The stakeholders discussed a few items
9. Due to their expertise in these matters, some (former) stakeholders have been nominated by
states to become part of the state delegations.
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halfheartedly for a while, and then the Chinese delegation explained that they
had to leave to attend their own morning meeting. The situation remained
unclear, and stakeholders were left wondering what this was all about.
Why could this sequence of events matter? Recall that it was China that
had stated in Phase 1 that “full-scale stakeholder engaging actions will add con-
siderable burden to IPBES,” and suggested that it would instead be better to
“engage a small group of key stakeholders” identified by the secretariat (China
2013). This position directly addressed the second concern, namely that of gov-
ernance and accountability. The draft for the negotiations proposed two options
for the proposed oversight (IPBES 2014a). In option 1, the development and
operation of an engagement strategy remained essentially the responsibility of
the secretariat. By contrast, option 2 suggested that the process be “overseen by
an inclusive, open-ended forum of stakeholders … in collaboration with the
secretariat” (IPBES 2014a, 2). These two options are indicative of the politics
of legitimation, since they reflect the struggle over the meaning of engagement
and how it should be governed. Option 1 presented a rather top-down model,
whereas option 2 emphasized ownership and self-governance by stakeholders.
However, with the proposal that notions of ownership and self-governance be
handled by a stakeholder forum, conflicts about representation came to the fore
again.10 These concerned different regions (North and South) as well as an
increase in the participation of powerful actors (not least from the industrial
sector). Delegates explored different versions of these two options, came up
with a third option, discarded it again, and continuously communicated new
wordings back and forth with the heads of their delegations. China, in particu-
lar, was very reluctant to agree on a final text. Again, a small change of wording
—from “forum” to “network”—made a consensus possible, since “network” in-
dicates a lesser degree of institutionalization. In the adopted text, the responsi-
bility mainly remains with the secretariat (similar to option 1). It requests “the
secretariat, under the supervision of the Bureau and the Plenary and in collab-
oration with an open-ended network of stakeholders, to undertake the activities,
as appropriate, set out in the initial implementation plan” (IPBES 2015, 98).
The relationship between this open-ended network and IPBES remains to be
specified. In other words, instead of creating an institutional sub-body of the
IPBES, in which stakeholders would oversee their contributions to the organi-
zation, state representatives kept stakeholder engagement on a tight leash and
did not integrate the open-ended network into IPBES’s institutional design.
Conclusions: Context, Reflexivity, and Power
In this article we have highlighted how the politics of legitimation shaped both
the dynamics and the design of the IPBES stakeholder strategy. In this concluding
10. The fourth draft enumerates a number of issues that need to be dealt with, such as eligibility
and selection criteria, gender, disciplines, balance of regions, and so forth (IPBES 2014a, 2).
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section, we first draw some conclusions that are closely related to our empirical
findings, and then discuss their wider importance for IPBES as well as for other
international expert organization.
IPBES has included a broad spectrum of actors, and as a result it has had to
respond to a diverse spectrum of legitimacy claims. By understanding the dy-
namics of the politics of legitimation in terms of opening up and closing down
design choices for these operative norms, we can trace three phases through
which the politics of legitimation has evolved.
In the first phase, we observed an opening up of the negotiation pro-
cesses to a plurality of voices, and thus to a diversity of legitimacy claims. The
politics-of-legitimation lens focused our attention on reflexive moments; dur-
ing this phase, the prevalent instrumental mode of participation was chal-
lenged, and alternatives were put on the agenda by actors who justified
participation on alternative, democratic grounds. Their rationale was to give
stakeholders a substantial voice and to empower them. During this phase,
we observed an opening up in relation to the definition of the rights and
responsibilities of stakeholders.
In the second phase, we saw how crucial categories such as “stakeholders”
(and their subcategories) themselves became sites of political contestation. Our
analysis also demonstrated how and why operative norms determining stake-
holder tasks, membership, and accountability affected the allocation of decision-
making authority within the IPBES. The performative character of these operative
norms offers a partial explanation of why stakeholder engagement and the norms
regulating it became contested issues. In relation to this, conflicts over the alloca-
tion of authority are often rooted in more fundamental differences in values, such
as competing rationales for engagement.
The third phase was characterized by attempts to close down the negotia-
tion processes during the subsequent formal adoption of the SES. Our analysis
also showed that calls for empowering a diversity of actors by giving them a
voice were marginalized during the negotiation processes. Although terms such
as “rights-holders” and “partners,” which imply putting states and stakeholders
on an equal footing, were frequently put forward, they were excluded from the
final version of the SES. This resulted in an ambivalent situation. On the one
hand, the adoption of the strategy was perceived as a crucial signal to stake-
holders.11 On the other hand, the increasing contributions of stakeholders in-
side the IPBES are not reflected in operative norms (such as the status of their
membership and voting rights). As we have shown in this case study, while
stakeholders were welcomed as knowledge holders, little room was afforded
for their empowerment as rights holders or partners. The instrumental manner
in which dominant actors justified participation also led to the exclusion of
alternative voices or democratic visions of the engagement.
11. A number of stakeholders voiced their relief online when the document was finally adopted
(IPBES Engagement Network 2015).
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What more general lessons can be learned from the IPBES about stake-
holder engagement in international expert organizations in general, and about
the politics of legitimation? We will stress three aspects that are of wider rele-
vance: namely, lack of reflexivity, the institutional setting, and power asymmetries.
First, whereas engagement was used to enhance the relevance of IPBES’s
work, our case study demonstrates that increased engagement does not auto-
matically bring about legitimacy, reflexivity, or relevance. This empirical out-
come is in no way unique to IPBES, but characterizes a variety of cases in
which norms of participation are invoked to address the needs of stakeholders.
In these cases, although the process was opened up, the norm of effectiveness
continued to dominate the construction of legitimacy, and there was limited
scope for participation (Connelly et al. 2006; Turnhout et al. 2015).
Second, our case study shows that the institutional setting in which engage-
ment practices are embedded has a critical impact on the dynamics of negotia-
tions. Whereas the first phase of negotiations was conducted in informal
settings such as workshops, making it possible to experiment with design options,
the third phase was shaped by the intergovernmental setting, where innovative
elements were systematically excluded. This empirical finding points to the deci-
sive role that the secretariat and individual states can play in determining the rights
of stakeholders within the IPBES. The intergovernmental status of the plenary and
its consensus-based procedures contributed to a narrowing down of agendas. As
result, they also limited the range of options put forward for debate in the nego-
tiations. Alternatives to existing institutionalized procedures (such as elevating the
official status of observer organizations) have been virtually excluded from the de-
bate. These efforts have ultimately served to limit stakeholders’ agency, and thus to
protect the prevailing allocation of power between state and nonstate actors. This
constraining effect of the institutional setting has also been observed in the case of
the IPCC (Beck 2015; see also Haas and Stevens 2011).
Third, these empirical findings highlight the importance of taking into ac-
count the relationship between the politics of legitimation and power. The IPBES
case study reveals how different actors tactically exploit the politics of legit-
imation to influence the process and its outcomes and to enhance their own
influence. In this way, actors seek to influence the distribution of power and
authority in the configuration of this new platform. To safeguard their influ-
ence, governments influenced negotiations within the IPBES plenary by control-
ling the processes and agendas (see Haas and Stevens 2011 for the case of the
IPCC).
The prevailing asymmetrical allocation of decision-making power within the
platform partly explains why stakeholders did not receive a voice. Governments
are the only formal members of the IPBES with decision-making power in the
plenary. As a result, they were in the position to formally adopt the SES and make
final decisions about norms and rules of procedure. This can explain why options
that might lead to a power shift, such as providing stakeholders with voting rights,
have been excluded from the agenda for intergovernmental negotiations. This
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asymmetry, enforced by the rules of procedure, has led to a growing mismatch
between the growing tasks of stakeholders and their marginal representation in
the main decision-making body of the platform (which once again may lead to
a situation characterized by the politics of legitimation).
Also in line with other case studies, stakeholder engagement was finally
shaped by the narrow intergovernmental setting, where scientists and govern-
ments only pay lip service to the importance of divergent voices, perspectives,
and knowledges (for the case of the MA, see also Filer 2009). In many cases, this
plea for participation was of a symbolic kind, with policy-makers and scientists
publicly embracing stakeholder involvement while internally (backstage)
following a narrowly scientific agenda (Chilvers and Kearnes 2016).
Stakeholder engagement has commonly been restricted to procedural
questions such as how participation processes can improve the legitimacy of
their outcome (see Mitchell et al. 2006). In this perspective, broader and more
balanced participation is often assumed to lend greater neutrality, and thus
legitimacy, to the end-product of the assessment. These procedural approaches,
however, underestimate the extent to which, in a variety of global assessments,
knowledge and power can be unequally available and differentially composed
(Klenk and Meehan 2015). Power imbalances, biased representation, and the
lack of access and capacities are challenges faced not only by IPBES but also
by IPCC and Future Earth (van der Hel 2016).
Given that knowledge-making about the global environment is not simply a
neutral input into policy, but a set of performative practices, constructivist
scholarship has long been concerned with questions of representation and
power in scientific advisory processes (Jasanoff 2012; Turnhout et al. 2016). This
scholarship has called for renewed attention to avowedly normative questions
about whose visions are being accorded legitimacy, at the expense of what other
ways of envisioning engagement? Are the people making the legitimacy claim the
right kind of people to speak for the phenomena they represent? These persistent
problems highlight the importance of openly addressing questions of representa-
tion, rather than defending the ideal of neutral expertise. The task for the future is
therefore to analyze the politics of legitimation also in terms of how social and
political asymmetries lead to inequalities in the “justification power” that enables
persons or groups to contest given justifications and create new ones. Given the
conditional, situated, and open nature of engagement, there is no general recipe
for how to justify and maintain legitimacy. But even if, as we suggest, there is no
simple or unitary model, ways of achieving a more self-aware and effective mode
of engagement remain an important topic for exploration.
References
Bäckstrand, Karin, Jamil Khan, Annica Kronsell, and Eva Lövbrand. 2010. Environmental
Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Gover-
nance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Alejandro Esguerra, Silke Beck, and Rolf Lidskog • 73
Beck, Silke. 2015. Science. In Research Handbook on Climate Governance, edited by Karin
Bäckstrand and Eva Lövbrand, 286–296. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Beck, Silke, Maud Borie, Jason Chilvers, Alejandro Esguerra, Katja Heubach, Mike Hulme,
Rolf Lidskog, Eva Lövbrand, Elisabeth Marquard, Clark Miller, Tahani Nadim,
Carsten Neßhöver, Josef Settele, Esther Turnhout, Eleftheria Vasileiadou, and
Christoph Görg. 2014. Towards a Reflexive Turn in Global Environmental Expertise—
The Cases of the IPCC and the IPBES. GAIA 23 (2): 80–88.
Borie, Maud, and Mike Hulme. 2015. Framing Global Biodiversity: IPBES between
Mother Earth and Ecosystem Services. Environmental Science & Policy 54: 487–496.
Carino, Joji. 2013. Statement delivered by Joji Carino of the Forest People’s Programme
on behalf of the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services at IPBES-2, Antalya, Turkey, December 9–14.
Chilvers, Jason, and Matthew Kearnes. 2016. Remaking Participation: Science, Environment
and Emergent Publics. London: Routledge.
China. 2013. Comment: Draft Stakeholder Engagement Strategy for Supporting Imple-
mentation of the IPBES Work Programme. Available at www.ipbes.net/images/
Review%20sheet%20_stakeholder%20engagement.pdf, accessed January 11, 2014.
Connelly, Steve, Tim Richardson, and Tim Miles. 2006. Situated Legitimacy: Deliberative
Arenas and the New Rural Governance. Journal of Rural Studies 22: 267–277.
Connelly, Steve. 2010. Constructing Legitimacy in the New Community Governance.
Urban Studies 48 (5): 929–946.
Filer, C. 2009. A Bridge Too Far: The Knowledge Problem in the Millennium Assessment.
In Virtualism, Governance and Practice: Vision and Execution in Environmental Conser-
vation, edited by James G. Carrier and Paige West, 84–111. New York: Berghahn.
Gupta, Aarti, Steinar Andresen, Bernd Siebenhüner, and Frank Biermann. 2012. Science
Networks. In Global Environmental Governance Reconsidered, edited by Frank
Biermann and Philipp H. Pattberg, 69–94. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Haas, Peter M., and Casey Stevens. 2011. Organized Science, Usable Knowledge, and
Multilateral Environmental Governance. In Governing the Air: The Dynamics of
Science, Policy, and Citizen Interaction, edited by Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist,
125–161. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hajer, Maarten A. 2009. Authoritative Governance: Policy-Making in the Age of Mediatization.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Heubach, Katja. 2013. NeFo Report—Summary of Comments Received—IPBES SES 2013.
Leipzig: Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research—UFZ. Available at
http://nefo.biodiv.naturkundemuseum-berlin.de/nefo/de/schnittstellen/produkte/
berichte, accessed February 22, 2016.
ICSU and IUCN. 2013. Statements on behalf of ICSU, the International Council for
Science, and IUCN, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, on Items
7(b). Available at www.diversitas-international.org/resources/news/news-2013/
IPBES2_201312_ICSUIUCNStatement_Item7_Final.pdf, accessed October 10, 2014.
IISD. 2013. Summary of the Second Session of the Plenary of the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Antalya, Turkey,
9–14 December 2013. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 31 (13). Available at www.iisd.
ca/vol31/enb3113e.html, accessed February 2, 2014.
IISD. 2015. ENB Summary of IPBES-3 | 12–17 January 2015 | Bonn, Germany | IISD
Reporting Services. Available at www.iisd.ca/vol31/enb3120e.html, accessed
March 4, 2016.
74 • Stakeholder Engagement in the Making: IPBES Legitimization Politics
IPBES. 2013a. Draft Stakeholder Engagement Strategy for Supporting Implementation of the
IPBES Work Programme: IPBES 2013 Intersessional Process. Online Review (17 June–28
July 2013). Available at www.ipbes.net/images/Draft%20stakeholder%20engagement
%20strategy%20-%20for%20online%20review.pdf, accessed February 22, 2014.
IPBES. 2013b. Draft Stakeholder Engagement for Supporting the Implementation
of the Platform’s Work Programme. IPBES/2/13. Available at www.ipbes.net/
images/documents/plenary/second/working/2_13/IPBES_2_13_EN.pdf, accessed
November 11, 2014.
IPBES. 2014a. Revised Draft Stakeholder Engagement Strategy: Deliverable 4(d). IPBES/
3/16. Available at http://ipbes.net/images/documents/plenary/third/working/
3_16/IPBES_3_16_EN.pdf, accessed November 11, 2014.
IPBES. 2014b. Revised Draft Stakeholder Engagement Strategy: Intersessional Period, for
Review—Deadline for Comments 3 October 2014. Available at www.ipbes.net/,
accessed November 11, 2014.
IPBES. 2015. Report of the Plenary of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Bio-
diversity and Ecosystem Services on the Work of Its Third Session. Bonn: IPBES. Available
at www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/downloads/IPBES_3_18_EN.pdf, accessed
February 28, 2016.
IPBES Engagement Network. 2015. Approved Text of the IPBES Stakeholder Engagement
Strategy–Google Groups. Available at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/
ipbes-engagement-network/APtWT1D4tFg/eQEP1Z2bpDUJ, accessedMarch 6, 2015.
IPBES Stakeholders. 2013. Stakeholder Consultation before the Second Session of the
IPBES Plenary (IPBES-2): Antalya, Turkey (Rixos Sungate Hotel—Room Maximus
1) Outputs of Day 2. Available at www.diversitas-international.org/resources/
news/news-2013/IPBES2_SHdays_OuputDay2.pdf, accessed October 10, 2014.
IUCN, ICSU, and NEFO. 2014. Outline of a Second Version of the IPBES Stakeholder
Engagement Strategy. Copy with the Authors.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2012. Science and Public Reason. New York: Routledge.
Jasanoff, Sheila, and Marybeth Long Martello. 2004. Earthly Politics: Local and Global in
Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Klenk, Nicole L., and Katie Meehan. 2015. Climate Change and Transdisciplinary Science:
Problematizing the Integration Imperative.Environmental Science andPolicy54: 160–167.
Larigauderie, Anne. 2015. The Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES): A Call to Action. GAIA 24 (2): 73.
Leino, Helena, and Juha Peltomaa. 2012. Situated Knowledge—Situated Legitimacy:
Consequences of Citizen Participation in Local Environmental Governance. Policy
and Society 31: 159–168.
Lidskog, Rolf, and Göran Sundqvist. 2011. Science-Policy-Citizen Dynamics in Interna-
tional Environmental Governance. In Governing the Air: The Dynamics of Science,
Policy, and Citizen Interaction, edited by Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist, 323–359.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lidskog, Rolf, and Göran Sundqvist. 2015. When Does Science Matter? International
Relations Meets Science and Technology Studies. Global Environmental Politics
15 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00269.
Marchetti, Raffaele. 2012. Models of Global Democracy: In Defense of Cosmo-Federalism.
InGlobalDemocracy:Normative andEmpirical Perspectives, editedbyDanieleArchibugi,
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, and Raffaele Marchetti, 22–46. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Alejandro Esguerra, Silke Beck, and Rolf Lidskog • 75
Mauz, Isabelle, and Céline Granjou. 2010. The Construction of Biodiversity as a Political
and Scientific Problem: Initial Results from an On-Going Survey. Sciences Eaux &
Territoires (03): 10–13.
Mitchell, Ronald Bruce, William C. Clark, David W. Cash, and Nancy M. Dickson. 2006.
Global Environmental Assessments. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nasiritousi, Naghmeh, Mattias Hjerpe, and Karin Bäckstrand. 2016. Normative
Arguments for Non-State Actor Participation in International Policymaking Processes:
Functionalism, Neocorporatism or Democratic Pluralism? European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 22 (4): 920–943. doi:10.1177/1354066115608926.
Opgenoorth, Lars, Stefan Hotes, and Harold Mooney. 2014. IPBES: Biodiversity Panel
Should Play by Rules. Nature 506 (7487): 159.
Philippines. 2013. Draft Stakeholder Engagement Strategy for Supporting Implementa-
tion of the IPBES Work Programme. Available at www.ipbes.net/plenary/interses-
sional, accessed August 7, 2013.
Reid, Walter V., Fikret Berkes, Thomas Wilbanks, and Doris Capistrano. 2006. Bridging
Scales and Knowledge Systems: Concepts and Applications in Ecosystem Assessment.
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007. International Crises of Legitimacy. International Politics 44 (2):
157–174.
Saurugger, Sabine. 2010. The Social Constructionof the Participatory Turn: The Emergence of
a Norm in the European Union. European Journal of Political Research 49 (4): 471–495.
Stirling, Andy. 2008. “Opening Up” and “Closing Down” Power, Participation, and
Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology. Science, Technology and Human
Values 33 (2): 262–294.
Sundqvist, Göran, Ingemar Bohlin, Erlend A. T. Hermansen, and Steven Yearley. 2015.
Formalization and Separation: A Systematic Basis for Interpreting Approaches to
Summarizing Science for Climate Policy. Social Studies of Science 45 (3): 416–440.
Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito. 2013. The Opening Up of
International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Turnhout,Esther, JelleBehagel, FrancescaFerranti, andRaoulBeunen.2015. TheConstruction
of Legitimacy in European Nature Policy: Expertise and Participation in the Service
of Cost-Effectiveness. Environmental Politics 24 (3): 461–480.
Turnhout, Esther, Art Dewulf, and Mike Hulme. 2016. What Does Policy-Relevant Global
Environmental Knowledge Do? The Cases of Climate and Biodiversity. Current
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 18: 65–72.
van der Hel, Sandra. 2016. New Science for Global Sustainability? The Institutionalisa-
tion of Knowledge Co-Production in Future Earth. Environmental Science and Policy
61: 165–175. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2016.03.012.
Watson, Robert T. 2005. Turning Science into Policy: Challenges and Experiences from
the Science-Policy Interface. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 360 (1454): 471–477.
Wynne, Brian. 2007. Public Participation in Science and Technology: Performing and
Obscuring a Political-Conceptual Category Mistake. East Asian Science, Technology
and Society 1 (1): 99–110.
Zürn, Michael. 2014. The Politicization of World Politics and Its Effects: Eight Proposi-
tions. European Political Science Review 6 (1): 47–71.
76 • Stakeholder Engagement in the Making: IPBES Legitimization Politics
